A Brief History of Federal Inuit Policy Development: Lessons in Consultation and Cultural Competence by Anderson, Erik & Bonesteel, Sarah
Western University
Scholarship@Western
Aboriginal Policy Research Consortium International (APRCi)
2010
A Brief History of Federal Inuit Policy




Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/aprci
Part of the Social Policy Commons
Citation of this paper:
Anderson, Erik and Bonesteel, Sarah, "A Brief History of Federal Inuit Policy Development: Lessons in Consultation and Cultural
Competence" (2010). Aboriginal Policy Research Consortium International (APRCi). 70.
https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/aprci/70
9
A Brief History of Federal Inuit 
Policy Development:  
Lessons in Consultation and 
Cultural Competence1
Erik Anderson and Sarah Bonesteel
Introduction
Consultation is a loaded concept in federal Aboriginal policy development. 
Canada now has a legal duty to consult in certain contexts thanks to two recent 
Supreme Court of Canada decisions.2 These decisions, and the situations that may 
trigger a legal duty to consult, however, continue to be open to interpretation. 
This is one reason why Aboriginal organizations increasingly refuse to use the 
term “consultation” when entering into discussion with Canada—for fear that any 
talks will be interpreted by Canada as fulfillment of its legal duty to consult and 
used as justification for taking certain policy decisions. The “meaningful consul-
tation” concept is an evolving area of Aboriginal policy development that will 
continue to be problematic as long as there are competing views of when and how 
consultation should take place, or indeed what is involved in meaningful consul-
tations. Compounding the difficulties of reaching agreement on what triggers or 
constitutes sufficient consultation can be a general mistrust of government. This 
mistrust stems from a long history in Canada of Aboriginal policies that would 
have a profound impact on Aboriginal peoples having been put in place without 
the benefit of consultation, and with sometimes disastrous results.
The Inuit Relations Secretariat (IRS) was created within Indian and Northern 
Affairs Canada (INAC) in 2004 to advocate for Inuit concerns within the federal 
system. It was established in response to the request by Inuit representatives for 
a focal point to address Inuit-specific issues within the federal government, and 
represents a significant advance in the struggle for an Inuit political voice within 
the federal “system.” One of the challenges facing the IRS and Inuit organizations 
is establishing new relationships of trust on a legacy of imposed policies and non-
existent or inadequate consultation.
When discussions began within INAC on the form and function of the newly 
announced IRS, the need for greater understanding and appreciation of the 
historic relationship between Inuit and the Government of Canada was imme-
diately apparent. As a result, a history project was begun that has culminated 
with the publishing of the book Canada’s Relationship with Inuit: A History of 
— 1 —
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Policy and Program Development. Government needed to understand and come 
to terms with the historic relationship in order to create new relationships under 
the secretariat and elsewhere; the policy-minded historian would argue that we 
cannot possibly create sound public policy for the future if we are not clear about 
how it is we got to where we are in the first place. Specifically, this includes an 
understanding of the mistakes that were made in the past, notably a lack of consul-
tation with Inuit when developing those policies, and a general lack of cultural 
competence and understanding on the part of policy-makers, service providers, 
and politicians, which made consultation and true consensus with Inuit difficult 
to achieve.3 An understanding of the historic relationship is important not only 
in terms of making sure that those mistakes are not repeated, but also in terms of 
understanding the root causes of the mistrust that exists today.
This paper provides a brief overview of the history of Inuit policy develop-
ment, largely based on the studies that underpin Canada’s Relationship with Inuit, 
but with specific emphasis on the shortcomings in consultation and the importing 
of social policies and programs designed in the south without fully consider-
ing uniquely northern circumstances or Inuit cultural norms. Some of the topics 
covered include government taking a more proactive role in Inuit administration 
with the Re Eskimo decision and E-number identification program, defence and 
sovereignty concerns which caused a major shift in northern policy and contributed 
to Inuit relocations, and subsequent post–Second World War federal programming 
in Inuit education, housing, and health care. Government faced many practical 
challenges in administering programs to a disperse Inuit population in the North, 
including difficulty hiring, training, and maintaining staff, as well as transporta-
tion and infrastructure costs. Many failures of early policy and program develop-
ment in meeting the needs of Inuit, however, may also be attributed both to a lack 
of consultation and lack of cultural competence.
Inuit Administration in the First Half of the 
Twentieth Century
Eighteenth-century contact with whalers, fur traders, missionaries, and police 
brought significant change to Inuit life in the Arctic. The introduction of foreign 
diseases, growing dependence on foreign trade goods and economic markets, 
missionary attempts at creating ideological and socio-cultural change, and impo-
sition of a foreign justice system have all been noted as examples of the negative 
influence of culture contact. Others, in less value-laden terms, have noted cultural 
shifts, sometimes subtle, as a result of increased contact, and specifically access 
to foreign trade goods. Yet, throughout the early contact period and the changes 
that it brought, there was also considerable continuity of cultural norms, patterns 
of subsistence, social structure maintenance. We also see, most importantly 
autonomy and agency that preceded the more active federal Inuit administration 
of the post–Second World War era.
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Beginning in the late nineteenth century, the North West Mounted Police 
(RCMP today), Hudson’s Bay Company (HBC), and mostly Anglican missionar-
ies were operating in the North.4 These organizations became unofficial admin-
istrators of Inuit affairs in large part by virtue of their very presence. The police 
administered law and justice, and performed functions on behalf of the govern-
ment, such as attempting to collect census information. In addition, the Canadian 
government expected the Hudson’s Bay Company operating in the North to be 
aware of challenges facing Inuit, such as food shortages, and to provide assis-
tance where necessary. The HBC had long been in the practice of providing relief 
to Aboriginal people in times of need, especially over the winter months, which 
it also undertook as part and parcel of its economic interests. Missionaries, in 
addition to establishing churches, often established schools and hospitals.
In 1905, the Canadian government’s Northwest Territories Amendment Act 
created the Northwest Territories (NWT) Council. This council operated from 
Ottawa, and was comprised of civil servants and the NWT commissioner, who 
was also the NWMP financial comptroller. The council, however, had no official 
mandate to administer Inuit affairs. In 1922, the Department of the Interior was 
reorganized to include a NWT and Yukon Branch with an Eskimo Affairs Unit. 
This is the first time that Inuit administration was formally recognized by the 
government. Focus, however, was placed on Inuit affairs in the western and eastern 
Arctic, as Newfoundland and Labrador were not yet part of Confederation, and 
Quebec was expected to administer to its north as a provincial government.
Two years later, in 1924, the Indian Act was amended to include Inuit. This 
was the first time Inuit were recognized in Canadian legislation, but a caveat was 
nevertheless added to the effect that Inuit would not become legal “wards of the 
state” like First Nations. These were uncertain times for Canada’s involvement in 
the North and Inuit administration. There was a sense of newfound independent 
nationhood and a growing interest in northern resources on the one hand, with the 
prosperity of the post–First World War years quickly giving way to concern over 
potential expenses at a time of economic recession on the other.5 Responsibility 
for Inuit was transferred to the Department of Indian Affairs at the time of the 
legislative amendments in 1924, but was transferred back to the Department of 
the Interior in 1928, and in 1930 the amendment to the Indian Act was repealed.6 
Also in 1930, the Northwest Territories Act was amended to include three 
elected northern members on the NWT Council. In addition to this council and 
the federal department responsible for Inuit affairs, other groups were organized 
to assist with Inuit and northern administration, including the Eskimo Affairs 
Committee, which was comprised of civil servants, and representatives from the 
RCMP, HBC, and churches. This group’s role was to advise and make recom-
mendations based on their experience in the North, and to assist Inuit in the tran-
sition to more sedentary communities. None of these administrative changes, 
however, would likely have been noticed by Inuit as the RCMP and missionar-
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ies continued to provide services in the North throughout the early part of the 
twentieth century.
Re Eskimo and Federal Constitutional Responsibility for Inuit
Federal responsibility for “Indians” is spelled out in s. 91(24) of the Constitution 
Act (1867) but Inuit are not mentioned.7 Throughout the 1930s, after the collapse 
of the fur trade, the Government of Canada provided some relief to Inuit in the 
eastern and western Arctic, as well as in Quebec. Quebec, however, was the only 
province inhabited by Inuit, and the federal government expected reimbursement 
for these expenses. In 1932, the Government of Quebec refused to continue reim-
bursing Canada because if felt that Inuit should be federally administered, like 
First Nations, and in 1935 it brought a case to the Supreme Court alleging that 
Inuit had been considered Indians at the time of the 1763 Royal Proclamation, 
and should be considered Indians under Section 91(24) of the Constitution Act 
(1867).8 The Supreme Court sided with Quebec in its 1939 Re Eskimo decision, 
which was based on many eighteenth- and nineteenth-century descriptions of 
“Esquimaux” as an “Indian Tribe.”9
This decision was unexpected for Canada, who initiated a reversal appeal to 
the Privy Council in England but dropped the appeal with the start of the Second 
World War.10 The Canadian government briefly considered comprehensive legis-
lation, similar to the Indian Act, but ultimately decided against it. The Re Eskimo 
decision did little to alter the delivery of government services or programs for Inuit, 
however, as committees within the Department of the Interior, and the Depart-
ment of Mines and Resources after 1936, continued to administer Inuit affairs.11 
Between 1939 and 1945, the government was preoccupied with the Second World 
War and most attention focused on the North was for sovereignty-related concerns 
rather than Inuit welfare. In 1951, to avoid the same level of responsibility for 
Inuit that they had for First Nations, the Indian Act was amended to specifically 
exclude Inuit, by including the statement that “a reference in this Act to an Indian 
does not include any person of the race of aborigines commonly referred to as 
Eskimos.” Although this amendment specifically excluded Inuit from sharing the 
status of registered Indians, the Re Eskimo decision continues to provide the basis 
for federal Inuit administration.12
The E-number Identification Program
One of the initial challenges facing the federal government in the administration 
of Inuit affairs in the North, whether directly or through other institutions such 
as the RCMP or churches, was the keeping of accurate records and statistics. 
Difficulties administering programs for Inuit included a lack of northern infra-
structure and a population that was highly mobile, spread out, and spent long 
periods of time away from what few centres of administration did exist. These 
difficulties were compounded by the reality of Inuit social and kinship structure 
in which surnames were not used and children were often named after significant 
APR Volume 7.indb   150 1/13/10   12:13:52 PM
 
This is an excerpt from "Volume 7: A History of Treaties and Policies" in the Aboriginal Policy Research Series, © Thompson Educational Publishing, Inc., 2013 
To order copies of this volume, visit www.thompsonbooks.com or call 1-877-366-2763.
  /  A Brief History of Federal Inuit Policy Development  /  11
or recently deceased family members, regardless of the sex of the name holder or 
namesake.13 Government generally administers programs in accordance with its 
knowledge of the size of the group being administered, and often requires tracking 
of individuals who come into contact with the administration, for example for 
medical services such as vaccination.
What came to be known as the E-number identification system was thus 
developed as a federal policy in 1941 to assist government officials, including the 
RCMP, and doctors and nurses, with keeping track of Inuit. Rather than consult-
ing those individuals whose well-being and welfare many of these programs were 
designed to address, government imposed a system of administration based on 
numbers being assigned which were to be worn on disks around the neck, similar 
to military-style “dog tags.”14 These numbered disks were used in the delivery of 
medical services such as eye exams and lung X-rays for tuberculosis, as well as 
the federal Family Allowance program. Between 1945 and 1970, all Inuit inter-
action with the federal and provincial or territorial governments required use of 
E-numbers.
For many Inuit, this system came to represent a form of paternalistic surveil-
lance that epitomized much of what was wrong with the imposition of foreign, 
southern-based, and inflexible administration created outside of a northern 
and Inuit cultural context. By the early 1960s government administrators were 
exploring other options as a result of Inuit dissatisfaction. In 1968, the NWT 
Council proposed Project Surname, in which federal administrators accompa-
nied by a bilingual Inuk travelled to all northern communities and registered both 
given and family surnames for Inuit. The project was completed around 1972 and 
use of E-numbers ended.
The period of Inuit administration leading up to the Second World War can be 
characterized by government uncertainty over the level of responsibility for Inuit 
affairs it should have or was willing to take on. This uncertainty helped contribute 
to a policy that advocated for a continuation of an Inuit traditional way of life, 
with limited interference. Despite some early awkward attempts by government 
to impose southern standards of administration across the North, such as the E-
number identification system, non-governmental institutions continued to admin-
ister many of the services in the North. Inuit over this period began to experience 
the acculturative tendencies of church-run education, ties to foreign markets, and 
some incremental intensification of administration imposed from without. Inuit 
were nevertheless able to maintain a degree of cultural continuity and autonomy 
away from the full gaze of federal administration. This situation, however, would 
begin to change with the building of defence projects throughout the North, and 
the influx of foreign personnel, and increased sedentariness that resulted.
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Military Defence, Sovereignty Concerns, and 
Relocation
Canada’s northern focus was on defence and sovereignty concerns in the immediate 
years after the Re Eskimo decision, during and after the Second World War. The 
first Canada-United States defence agreement saw the creation of the Permanent 
Joint Board of Defence, established through the 1940 Ogdensburg Agreement, 
which included the creation of the Alaska Highway, the Northwest Staging 
Route, and the Canadian Oil (Canol) pipeline.15 Between 1940 and 1943, thirty 
thousand American service people were stationed across the Arctic, from Alaska 
to Greenland, to construct and carry out northern defence projects.16 Although 
these projects received joint approval from the Canadian and American govern-
ments, they were largely carried out by Americans under American authority.
In 1955, Canada and the United States agreed to construct a chain of sixty-
three radar stations—the Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line—with forty-two 
stations located along the Canadian Arctic coast. The stations were American built 
and operated, but on sites requiring Canadian government approval, subject to 
Canadian law, and operated from the outset with provisions for eventual Canadian 
control.17 In 1957, another agreement, the North American Air Defence Agreement 
(NORAD), was struck between Canada and the United States to develop a system 
of continental air defence.18 The 1959 Ballistic Missile Early Warning System 
(BMEWS) agreement was an example of NORAD’s defence strategy. In 1980, 
aging DEW Line technology was replaced with the North Warning System (NWS) 
and thirteen minimally attended radars (MARs).19 The cost of upgrading defence 
technology was again shared by Canada and the United States who continued, 
through agreements such as NORAD, to cooperate on common defence initiatives 
in the North.20
Inuit in the Northwest Territories and northern Quebec were not consulted 
about the construction of defence infrastructure or the selection of site locations 
in the territories that they traditionally inhabited. Significant short-term impact on 
Inuit included an increasingly sedentary lifestyle, and access to foreign foods and 
material goods. Defence project sites, including Iqaluit, Broughton Island, Kivitoo, 
and Ekalugad Fiord, attracted Inuit to congregate nearby for access to employ-
ment opportunities and medical services, creating sedentary communities over 
time. By 1963, NORAD provided employment for 14,700 Canadians (including 
Inuit) at stations in the North and throughout Canada.21 Although defence project 
sites were initially expected to provide temporary employment for Inuit, various 
cultural differences, such as concepts of work time and levels of training, created 
difficulties. Some sustained employment was created through the development of 
programs like the Canadian Rangers, which uses traditional Inuit survival skills 
and knowledge to assist Canadian and American defence personnel in Arctic 
operations.22 Mostly, however, defence programs failed to provide sustained or 
large-scale employment for Inuit.
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Over the long term, an influx of Canadian and American service people and 
general defence spending in the North has contributed significantly to the northern 
economy and northern infrastructure.23 The effects of defence sites on the devel-
opment of housing, transport, communications, infrastructure, education, and 
health care have been significant to community development. American criticism 
of Canadian Inuit policy, or a lack thereof, was further instrumental in the devel-
opment of Inuit administration and related northern infrastructure. For example, 
criticism of Inuit housing conditions was a factor in prompting the development 
of a large-scale construction and home rental program in many northern commu-
nities during the 1960s.24 Inuit settlement in communities was motivated by 
employment, such as at DEW Line sites, by children attending school, proximity 
to medical treatment, and housing construction projects.
Although Inuit maintained a pattern of life based on seasonal migrations and 
resource availability until the mid-twentieth century, since 1960 most Inuit have 
lived in permanent settlements with access to health care, schools, and other 
government services. These changes came at some cost to Inuit traditional liveli-
hood, through increased reliance on wage labour and effects of globalization that 
accompany increased sedentariness. Once settled in communities, Inuit reliance 
on traditional ways of life could become difficult because of the lengthy travel 
distances required to find animal resources which were often not available near 
communities, and the need to maintain a steady family income through wage 
employment.
Another significant long-term impact of defence projects has been the envi-
ronmental pollution created by the construction and subsequent abandoning of 
many of the original sites. There have been some recent attempts to clean up the 
environmental damage caused by these projects. Based on the initial American 
construction and operation of the DEW Line sites, the United States government 
has contributed $100 million over the past ten years under the Canada-United 
States Military Installations Clean-Up Agreement to Canada’s clean-up projects. 
The total cost of cleaning up the forty-two Canadian DEW Line sites has been 
estimated at between $320 and $500 million.25
Finally, American activity in the Canadian North created sovereignty concerns 
for the Canadian government, which would also come to have a profound impact 
on certain Inuit communities. In 1943, the British high commissioner to Canada 
toured the Arctic to review project construction, and expressed concern regarding 
American intent to construct roads and airport infrastructure that would serve 
commercial interests after the war. These concerns prompted the Canadian govern-
ment to initiate a greater northern presence, including increasing the number of 
civil servants stationed in the North, and to develop programs and administra-
tion to improve Inuit welfare and create sedentary communities.26 Creating more 
sedentary Inuit communities served the dual purpose of making it easier for 
government to provide services, such as health care, and also helping to address 
government’s growing sovereignty concerns.
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Canada’s effective sovereignty over the Arctic Archipelago can be traced back 
to an 1880 Order-in-Council which confirmed Dominion title and ownership of 
the islands, and subsequent responsibility for their surveillance.27 Inuit habitation 
of the North since time immemorial and this Order-in-Council, as a deed of title, 
have formed the basis for Canada’s historic claim to sovereignty of the North. At 
the turn of the twentieth century, the Canadian government became increasingly 
concerned about the unregulated presence of foreign nationals sailing through 
passageways between the Arctic Islands.28 This, and conflicts over fishing rights 
in the Sverdrup Islands, resulted in increased government-sponsored Arctic tours 
and the establishment of RCMP posts, initially at Pond Inlet and at Craig Harbour 
on the southeast corner of Ellesmere Island, followed by Dundas Harbour on 
Devon Island, Pangnirtung and Lake Harbour on Baffin Island, and Port Burwell 
in northern Newfoundland.
Inuit Relocations29
The relocations of Inuit communities that took place in the 1950s and 1960s are 
the most controversial of the many northern initiatives. These relocations were 
partially or entirely designed to address Canada’s sovereignty concerns, and were 
taken in tandem with establishing RCMP posts, official tours of the region, the 
Northern Rangers program, increased numbers of civil servants, science and 
exploration, and developing a military presence. The Canadian government 
initially facilitated Inuit relocations to move Inuit to areas of supposed resources 
abundance beginning in the 1920s.30 The HBC also proposed relocation projects 
to the federal government where they argued Inuit trappers were needed to assist 
the opening up of posts across the Arctic. In 1934 for example, Inuit from Cape 
Dorset were relocated to Devon Island when the HBC reopened a post that had 
closed several years earlier.31 In the 1940s and 1950s, however, relocations were 
justified not only in an access to resources context, but were also motivated by 
sovereignty reasons. Some Inuit were relocated seasonally, such as those in the 
western Arctic who were encouraged to winter at Banks Island and Herschel 
Island during the 1950s, with both the assertion of sovereignty and the fear of 
starvation as motivating concerns. According to the Royal Commission Report 
on Aboriginal Peoples, in many cases with early relocations, Inuit were satisfied 
with their new surroundings or were assisted in returning to their original territory 
if they were unhappy.32
Although relocations of Inuit families were supposedly conducted to areas of 
resource abundance where Inuit could live self-sufficiently, the federal govern-
ment also had a de facto concern for sovereignty of the Canadian Arctic.33 The 
1953 relocations of Inuit families from Port Harrison (Inukjuak) and Pond Inlet 
to Resolute Bay and Grise Fiord (Craig Harbour) were perhaps the most contro-
versial. Government motivations for the relocation were not clearly conveyed to 
the Inuit involved or to the Canadian public, and Inuit were moved from northern 
Quebec to the High Arctic, which involved adaptations to a colder climate and 
APR Volume 7.indb   154 1/13/10   12:13:53 PM
 
This is an excerpt from "Volume 7: A History of Treaties and Policies" in the Aboriginal Policy Research Series, © Thompson Educational Publishing, Inc., 2013 
To order copies of this volume, visit www.thompsonbooks.com or call 1-877-366-2763.
  /  A Brief History of Federal Inuit Policy Development  /  1
longer periods of total light or darkness. Additionally, it is unclear if the govern-
ment made or honoured promises to return Inuit to northern Quebec if and when 
requests to return were made.
In 1993, the Royal Commission on Aboriginal People (RCAP) investigated 
claims against the government made by Inuit who participated in this relocation 
and their descendants.34 A presentation to the commission by then-president of 
Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami, Rosemarie Kuptana, focused on the cultural and histori-
cal context of relations between Inuit and non-Inuit in northern Quebec during 
the 1950s, and in particular the concept of “ilira.” According to Kuptana, “Inuit 
use ilira to refer to a great fear or awe, such as the awe a strong father inspires 
in his children.”35 The growth of the fur trade and disease epidemics combined 
to increase Inuit dependency on non-Inuit, including RCMP and HBC staff and 
missionaries, producing a feeling of ilira among Inuit in their relations with non-
Inuit. As Kuptana stated to the commission, real consultation of potential reloca-
tions was not possible with Inuit, as “a challenge to the authority of the Qallunaat 
[white people] or defiance of their requests was almost unthinkable.”36
The commission published their report in 1994, concluding that the relocation 
plan “was inherently unsound, it was misrepresented to Inuit to gain their concur-
rence, and the means adopted to carry out the plan were equally unsound.” The 
report went on to state that, however inappropriate the project, “the Government 
did what it believed to be best for the Inukjuak Inuit in the institutional context 
of the time.”37 Although Inuit had requested recognition for their contribution to 
Canadian sovereignty, the commission concluded that economics, or their belief 
in the presence of animal resources at Resolute and Grise Fiord, were the primary 
motivators for the relocation, with sovereignty, to an unknown degree, acting as a 
material consideration in the sites chosen to relocate Inuit.38
By the 1970s the Canadian government was not sponsoring many new relocation 
projects. While sovereignty of the Arctic Archipelago and defence of the northern 
coastal mainland were still concerns to the Canadian government, increases in 
defence technology and American defence partnerships meant that Inuit residency 
in remote areas was no longer considered so pressing as a means to monitor the 
North. Also, increased availability of consumer goods in permanent communi-
ties meant that Inuit relocations to regions where the government thought there 
was better hunting and access to natural resources were also no longer consid-
ered necessary.39 Controversy over unsuccessful relocations during the 1950s and 
1960s, findings that government-sponsored relocations in the late 1960s and early 
1970s did not result in predicted levels of Inuit employment, and the evolving 
federal-Inuit political relationship all made Canada less likely to initiate further 
Inuit relocation projects.40
In 1972, the Royal Commission on Labrador set out nine principles for future 
resettlements based on earlier relocation experiences in southern Labrador. These 
principles recommended that resettlements only occur after extensive consulta-
tion with departing and receiving community members, and after planning and 
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preparation to ensure long-term socio-economic viability of relocated individuals 
in their new community.41 Many communities developed through Inuit reloca-
tions, such as Resolute and Grise Fiord, continue to exist, and Inuit today are 
supportive of measures to ensure Canadian sovereignty of the North and seek to 
work with the federal government to ensure the environmental sustainability of 
those measures. 42 Many Inuit, however, continue to seek redress of past circum-
stances surrounding relocations and the hardships that resulted, and continue to 
criticize the Canadian and other Arctic-nation governments for lack of consulta-
tion with Inuit in consideration of sovereignty concerns.43
Regardless of the motivation for the relocations, or which of various motivat-
ing factors was the primary consideration for Canada at the time, it is the process 
employed in the relocations, specifically the lack of full and meaningful consulta-
tion, which bears examination as a means to address past government policies. The 
limited consultation that did occur was no doubt consistent with the government’s 
paternalistic attitudes of the day when developing programs for the Aboriginal 
population more generally. Added to this government-knows-best attitude was a 
seeming lack of cultural awareness or inability to take into consideration social 
norms of behaviour when entering into consultation at the community level. This 
lack of ability to communicate on an equal footing of mutual understanding is 
what Rosemary Kuptana was speaking about with the social concept of “ilira” 
in the Inuit experience of human interaction, which made it difficult for Inuit 
to challenge the authority of the “Qallunaat.” Even where government officials 
may have felt they had the concurrence and full cooperation of Inuit in certain 
circumstances, this may not have been the case at all in the Inuit view. These relo-
cation experiences have resulted in negative feelings and mistrust of government 
intentions, and speak directly to the ongoing need for cultural competence when 
developing policy in an Aboriginal context.
Post–Second World War Program Development in 
Education, Health Care, and Housing
In 1950, administration of Inuit was the responsibility of the Northern Affairs 
Program, which was managed by the Department of Resources and Development, 
and then the Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources from 1953 
to 1966. Up until about 1950, the Canadian government advocated for Inuit to 
retain their traditional way of life. In 1955, however, Jean Lesage, the minister 
of the newly created Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources, 
announced a new policy for Inuit administration. The objective was to remedy the 
“almost continuing state of absence of mind” in which Inuit had previously been 
administered, by introducing a large influx of northern social programs during 
the 1950s and 1960s.44 This shift in policy was partly the result of a newfound 
ethos in Canada (and much of the western world) towards social welfare, and 
partly in reaction to heavy and sustained criticism from American service men 
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and women involved in northern defence projects of what they perceived to be the 
Canadian government’s neglect of Inuit, including in health care, education, and 
housing. Several national social welfare programs, which extended to Inuit both 
as a matter of course and to encourage permanent settlement, were created at this 
time. Many of the growing cadre of civil servants in the North had little northern 
experience, and while they may have provided services in a way that seemed most 
pragmatic at the time,45 they often did so without the cultural competence required 
for successful implementation or outcomes.
Education
By the end of the Second World War, there were four church-run residential 
schools and nine day schools in the Northwest Territories and northern Quebec, 
with several more schools in Labrador.46 The Canadian government was initially 
reluctant to increase funding for missionary societies or to take a larger role in 
developing a federal system of education in the North for an Inuit population 
that continued to live semi-nomadically. The government had in fact advocated 
for maintenance of a traditional way of life for Inuit, and was concerned that 
children educated in residential schools would not learn necessary survival skills. 
Missionaries and American army personnel stationed in the Canadian North 
during the 1940s, however, perceived this policy to be shortsighted in failing to 
provide basic literacy, compared to the education systems for Inuit in Alaska and 
Greenland.47 In 1947, the Department of Mines and Resources, through the Bureau 
of Northwest Territories and Yukon Affairs, assumed responsibility for Inuit 
education, intending to provide the same quality of programming in the North as 
in southern Canada. To this end, the Department of Resources and Development 
initiated a sub-committee on Eskimo education in 1952.
A further agreement for federal administration of Inuit education was made in 
1955 between federal departments, the NWT Council, and the Roman Catholic 
and Anglican churches. Under this agreement, the federal government assumed 
responsibility for all schools, but agreed to partially fund church-run hostels that 
housed students while they attended school. Hostels were similar in purpose to 
residential schools but required fewer staff to operate and could be dispersed 
through more communities, allowing children in some cases to remain closer to 
their parents while they attended school. Nevertheless, hostels and residential 
schools removed children from their parents’ care for up to ten months of each 
year, and, as is now well documented, created cultural alienation between Inuit 
parents and children.48
Initially, the federal system for northern education adopted the curriculum 
standards from southern Canada. This meant that the subjects and topics covered, 
and the methods of instruction, were unfamiliar to Inuit and required Inuit to learn 
English vocabulary for cultural references that were unfamiliar to them, such as 
the traffic lights and cornfields that were presented in their textbooks.49 Inuit also 
experienced difficulty maintaining motivation to learn in a “school system [that] 
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attempted to introduce them to a value system that stressed individual achieve-
ment, advancement and self-discipline in return for future rewards.”50 Inuit culture 
was present-oriented and sensitive to the maintenance of community relations, 
making acculturation to such individualistic and long-term concepts difficult. As 
well as requesting more culturally sensitive curricula, Inuit expressed interest in 
programming that would educate adults and would help parents to understand the 
government’s goals for their children’s education.51 Elementary school teachers 
were nearly all from southern Canada, most had no previous experience in northern 
communities or with Inuit, and had little or no knowledge of Inuit languages or 
culture when they first arrived.
Education was a highly acculturative force for assimilating Inuit to southern 
Canadian culture, and Inuit parents had long requested changes to make the curric-
ulum more relevant to Inuit. These requests included involvement of Inuit parents 
in the classroom as storytellers and guest teachers, use of traditional languages for 
instruction, and the incorporation of Inuit cultural elements into the curriculum.52 
Efforts were made in the late 1950s and 1960s to address these concerns through 
programs designed to sensitize southern teachers working in the North, hiring 
Inuit educational assistants to help classroom teachers by translating lessons and 
curriculum into Inuit languages,53 and developing a curriculum that was meant to 
be more relevant to northern students.
Systemic problems in the educational services continued, however, despite 
the construction of secondary schools, and efforts to offer a modified curriculum 
relevant to the North and to ensure that all Inuit children between the ages of six 
and fifteen were attending school during the 1960s.54 The dispersed nature of the 
Inuit population, their semi-nomadic way of life, teacher shortages, and the high 
cost of providing staff, supplies, and facilities, created difficulties for govern-
ment administrators in developing an effective system for Inuit education.55 The 
government had difficulty both accommodating students in remote locations and 
keeping pace with the population increase of growing northern communities when 
Inuit did begin to settle in centralized, permanent locations. Many Inuit chose not 
to complete secondary studies, or take advantage of post-secondary studies in 
the south, because of the long separation from their families that was required. 
Northern teachers reported, “a persistent failure of native peoples to achieve 
success within the system,” and expressed concern about the “extreme alien-
ation” schooling caused young Inuit attempting to balance their traditional culture 
practiced at home and the school culture experienced at elementary day schools 
and secondary residential schools. Inuit also continued to claim “immense dissat-
isfaction” with many of the policies, curricula, teachers, and educational facili-
ties.56 In the late 1960s, many parents and non-Inuit teachers alike from smaller 
communities objected to the federal government’s lack of consultation in deciding 
to construct the eastern Arctic’s only secondary school in Iqaluit.
Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami (ITK) has argued against education systems that assim-
ilate Inuit to southern Canadian culture, with consequent loss of their sense of 
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identity.57 Throughout the 1970s, Inuit in the Northwest Territories perceived that 
the federal government was not sufficiently consulting them about the develop-
ment of educational programs and facilities. In response, Inuit established the 
National Inuit Council on Education (NICE) within ITK’s Inuit Cultural Institute 
(ICI) in 1976.58 The objective of NICE was to determine the feasibility of estab-
lishing Inuit-administered education facilities throughout the North, which would 
provide a more culturally and geographically relevant education system for Inuit 
children. Rather than relying on the federal government to develop educational 
infrastructure and curriculum, and to hire educators for northern schools, ITK 
sought to develop an educational program that would encourage children to attend 
school and would provide them with an education that was sufficient preparation 
for northern employment opportunities.59
In 1973, the Man in the North Project, sponsored by the Arctic Institute of 
North America, released a report on education in Nunavik and the Northwest 
Territories that called for increased efforts to incorporate community members 
in the delivery of education programs, increased opportunities for training Inuit 
as teachers, and better preparation of non-Inuit teachers for the culture and 
way of life in northern communities. The goal of the Nunavik program was to 
demonstrate to young school-aged children that Inuit community members did 
“play a meaningful role within the school curriculum,” thereby facilitating their 
adaptation to the school culture and system.60 Such experimental programs rein-
forced the need to train Inuit teachers within their communities, thereby retaining 
local teachers long-term, and minimizing the discontinuity in schools associated 
with replacing non-Inuit teachers who usually stayed for only one or two years. 
According to the project’s report, training Inuit teachers would also help to ensure 
that culturally relevant and sensitive curricula were being delivered in northern 
classrooms.61 Concern over relevant content remains, however, as witnessed 
by the 2006 report by Justice Thomas Berger, conciliator of the Nunavut Land 
Claims Agreement implementation, which recommended further increasing the 
relevancy of Nunavut’s educational curricula.62
Health Care
Beginning in 1922, the Canadian government provided some health care through 
the Eastern Arctic Patrol, which was a ship that made annual tours of the coast 
and Arctic Islands. The patrol included RCMP, medical personnel, and govern-
ment staff, who provided supplies, medical and dental care, and the ship was 
used to transport Inuit to southern hospitals for treatment.63 Throughout the 1930s 
and 1940s, rates of respiratory infection, particularly tuberculosis, were much 
higher than the Canadian average among Inuit. In treating Inuit with tubercu-
losis, the Canadian government faced similar challenges as providing education 
in the North: the dispersed Inuit population, the shortage of medical personnel, 
the difficulty in transporting Inuit to hospitals, and the cost of building medical 
facilities. By the 1940s, there were eleven hospitals in the Northwest Territo-
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ries, nine of which were operated by missions and two that were operated by 
mining companies. Yet, many communities lacked the health care professionals 
and the equipment needed to make diagnoses and to provide adequate responses 
for several serious and widespread ailments, including tuberculosis, influenza, 
cerebral-spinal meningitis, and paratyphoid fever.64
Believing that the tuberculosis recovery rate was higher when Inuit were sent to 
pre-existing and well-staffed southern sanitaria, the government adopted a policy 
of sending all Inuit with tuberculosis to southern Canada, including sanitaria in 
Edmonton, Hamilton, and Montreal. Many Inuit, missionaries, and government 
personnel stationed in the North, however, were critical of this policy due to the 
trauma caused by the separation of Inuit family members forced to take the long 
trip on the arctic patrol boat to southern sanitaria, particularly when they died 
in the south and did not return.65 Nevertheless, in 1956, an estimated 10 percent 
of the Inuit population was receiving medical treatment, mainly for tuberculo-
sis, in southern Canadian hospitals.66 Between 1953 and 1964, 4,836 Inuit in the 
Northwest Territories were hospitalized, and 75 to 80 percent were sent to sanitaria 
in southern Canada. By the early 1950s, tuberculosis was still the leading cause of 
death among Inuit but the rate of infection had begun to decline.
Another major cause of concern for medical personnel in the North during the 
mid-twentieth century was the high incidence of infant mortality. Through the shift 
from subsistence hunting to commercial trapping, and later wage labour, Inuit had 
less time and access to animals for hunting, and incorporated more carbohydrate-
based foods, such as bannock, into their diets. The loss of nutrients from meat in 
the diet created high rates of undernourishment, which became a leading cause of 
death in young children. Relocations of Inuit to regions with supposedly better 
resources also created nutrition problems when resources did not materialize or 
when Inuit experienced difficulty adapting to the changed climatic conditions.67
Government’s solution to alleviate undernourishment in children was to 
increase the availability of powdered milks and cereals, like Pablum. Government 
officials in communities, and members of the annual Eastern Arctic Patrol, took 
some pains to educate Inuit mothers in the use of these foods, including how to 
prepare and store them. By the mid-1960s, however, Canadian Medical Service 
studies continued to show high rates of mortality, now mainly among bottle-fed 
children. The introduction of powdered food suitable for infants discouraged 
mothers from breast-feeding, lowering their infants’ resistance to gastrointestinal 
infection, respiratory problems, middle ear problems and anemia.68
Inadequate housing was also thought to contribute to infant mortality, which 
tended to occur at age two or three, just after children were weaned. By the late 
1960s and early 1970s, most Inuit lived in sedentary communities. While govern-
ment homes improved access to medical care, the shift to sedentary community 
life, with high levels of unemployment and nutritionally inadequate diets, led to 
increases in mental and other health problems, such as obesity and high rates 
of diabetes, depression, suicide, substance abuse, and family dysfunction.69 The 
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delivery of northern health care has been hindered by inadequate infrastructure 
for water delivery and sewage disposal, and overcrowded housing conditions in 
many communities. Ensuring that elements contributing to good health, including 
clean water, effective waste disposal, sufficient housing, and adequate amounts 
of nutritious food, are present in northern communities is an issue of continual 
concern. The retention of medical staff in northern communities and access to 
culturally appropriate health care also remain significant concerns.
Housing
During the 1950s, concerns about northern sovereignty, health conditions, and 
administration of social welfare programs prompted the government to initiate 
construction of permanent housing for Inuit to rent or purchase. Government 
housing projects were particularly challenged by the high costs of building and 
maintaining homes in the North, including costs of transporting construction and 
insulation materials, fuel to heat homes, and importing builders from southern 
Canada.
Two of the early housing models that the federal government field tested were an 
igloo-shaped dwelling with a plywood floor and six-inch-thick Styrofoam walls, 
and the “rigid digit,” which was made from plywood sheeting with a polyethyl-
ene vapour barrier and rockwool batting insulation. Both models were designed 
to be portable in order to assist Inuit in maintaining some traditional subsistence 
practices. The rigid digit was slightly larger than a traditional family tent, and 
had only one room. The Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources 
considered the rigid digit to be transitional housing—somewhere between the size 
and durability of a skin tent or igloo, and southern Canadian housing standards. 
The total cost of each rigid digit unit was five hundred dollars, making construction 
of many units attractive for the federal government within communities across the 
Arctic.70 Experiments in designing Inuit-style housing were discontinued during 
the 1950s, however, as more Inuit became sedentary and the need for portable 
housing declined. In addition, none of the housing styles tested by the government 
were able to provide the necessary levels of cost-efficiency and durability.
Also, during the 1950s government provided more southern-style, pre-fabri-
cated two bedroom houses for its employees, complete with plumbing and hydro, 
which stood in stark contrast to the size and construction quality of Inuit housing. 
The discrepancies in housing prompted criticism, including from government 
employees engaged to provide education and health services for Inuit.71 Inuit 
by the early 1970s were still objecting to the obvious discrepancies in the size 
and design qualities of their homes compared to the federal government’s staff 
housing, and were supported in their request for better housing by the members of 
Parliament from the Northwest Territories.72
In 1959, the government established the Eskimo Housing Loan Program, which 
saw the construction of 1,200 “matchbox” structures. These were fixed-location 
dwellings, designed to meet government criteria of cost-effectiveness in construc-
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tion and operation. Challenges with the program included the prohibitive cost of 
utilities, inadequate housing size and design for the northern climate, and Inuit 
inexperience with rent and mortgage payments. These houses were designed and 
field tested in Ottawa, and their spatial divisions reflected patterns of family use 
common in southern Canada, rather than spatial needs of Inuit culture and the 
northern way of life. For example, early homes did not include space to prepare 
country food, repair hunting and transportation equipment, or entertain.73 Further, 
the Inuit preference for boiling as a common method of cooking was not taken into 
consideration, and caused high levels of condensation leading to iced windows 
and warped walls and floors.
Anthropologist Peter Dawson’s 2003 study of space syntax in Inuit homes 
demonstrates the need to create Inuit-specific housing designs that recognize 
the significance of maintaining extended family cohesion through the use of 
large spaces for both shared and individual activities. Such ideals of spatial use 
encourage traditional cultural values of family solidarity, reciprocal assistance, 
and traditional renewable resource harvesting activities. Through his fieldwork, 
Dawson recorded Inuit concerns about housing design including small room size, 
lack of storage space, dislike of multi-storey houses, and failure of houses to stand-
up to extreme climatic conditions. As housing designs in northern communities 
are usually still modeled on southern Canadian ideals of family spatial use, Inuit 
often modify their homes in a number of ways to improve efficiency of heating 
and water use; to improve safety; and to more closely approximate families’ tradi-
tional use of open, rather than divided, domestic space.74
In the 1960s, the government redeveloped the program to address some of the 
earlier challenges. The new program, called the Eskimo Rental Housing Program, 
featured rent scaled to real income with the costs of fuel, electricity, and furniture 
included. Rental payments were applied to eventual home purchase. Housing 
constructed for the Eskimo Housing Loan Program was re-used, and larger 
three-bedroom models were constructed.75 As more Inuit moved to communities 
from the land, overcrowding in federally-constructed housing became a concern. 
Studies conducted in 1964 and 1965 showed correlations between high rates of 
infant mortality and respiratory disease caused by overcrowding and unsanitary 
housing. The government established a goal of fixed-location housing for all Inuit 
by 1971.76 Under the Eskimo Rental Housing Program, Inuit were expected to 
participate in a four-stage adult education program designed to assist the transi-
tion to living in fixed-location homes.77 The education program included instruc-
tion in safety precautions, tenants’ responsibilities, and facilitated the develop-
ment of tenant associations and community governments.
In 1971, administration of northern housing was transferred to the Canadian 
Mortgage and Housing Corporation under the National Housing Act. Although 
government housing led to declines in respiratory illness and infant mortality, 
and increases in day-school attendance, there were other challenges of meeting 
increased housing demand, as well as new health problems like diabetes and other 
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issues related to chronic unemployment. Inuit continued to experience inadequa-
cies of supply and design in the housing provided for them, despite the attempts 
to provide sufficient amounts of affordable housing for residents of the Northwest 
Territories.78 Many issues with the size, design, quality, cost, and availability of 
houses in northern communities remain to this day.
Although northern housing has been increasingly administered by territorial 
and Inuit governments, according to Pauktuutit and Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami (ITK), 
the federal government’s 1993 withdrawal from their cost-sharing agreements for 
Inuit housing with the territorial governments, the Government of Quebec, and the 
Government of Newfoundland and Labrador, has had a significant and negative 
impact on the maintenance and availability of housing in northern communities.79 
ITK perceives that the housing shortage in northern communities is a contributing 
factor to the high incidence of a variety of social problems, and seeks a federally 
sponsored Inuit-specific housing initiative that will ensure training and employ-
ment opportunities for Inuit, as well as home-ownership subsidies.80 Northern 
housing construction is extremely costly for all governments, and has not kept 
pace with the growing Inuit population, leading to high levels of overcrowding. 
As several people indicated during interviews for the book Canada’s Relationship 
with Inuit, poor-quality, overcrowded housing is directly linked to health chal-
lenges, poor school performance, and community social problems. Addressing the 
housing challenge is widely considered to be essential in addressing many other 
challenges towards closing the gap in well-being between southern Canada and 
the North.
Conclusion
The rise of Inuit political organizations and related evolution of comprehensive 
land claims represent major steps towards Inuit self-determination and control 
over policy matters central to Inuit concerns. Most day-to-day Inuit affairs are 
now administered by the territorial governments or the regional governments 
created through comprehensive claim settlements. Education and many health 
care services, for example, have increasingly shifted from federal to territorial 
and Inuit control through the four Inuit comprehensive claims that were settled 
between 1975 and 2005.
The Canadian government, however, continues to provide a number of Inuit 
or northern specific programs, and the Inuit Relations Secretariat was recently 
created within INAC to act as a hub for federal Inuit administration, which still 
mainly occurs through INAC at the federal level. Federal programs designed to 
address the cost of health care in the North, for example, include: the Northern Air 
Stage Program (Food Mail Program), which subsidizes the cost of transporting 
fresh foods to the North and is intended to lower consumers’ costs for purchasing 
such foods; Health Canada’s Non-Insured Health Benefits Program for Inuit (and 
First Nations), which covers the cost of medically necessary goods and services 
APR Volume 7.indb   163 1/13/10   12:13:54 PM
 
This is an excerpt from "Volume 7: A History of Treaties and Policies" in the Aboriginal Policy Research Series, © Thompson Educational Publishing, Inc., 2013 
To order copies of this volume, visit www.thompsonbooks.com or call 1-877-366-2763.
1  /  Part Two: From History to Policy
not covered by the territory or province in which Inuit reside; and the Head Start 
Program, which prepares preschoolers for elementary school. Other important 
areas where the federal-Inuit relationship is being negotiated include the role of 
Inuit in northern sovereignty, self-government (particularly in the western Arctic 
and in northern Quebec), and comprehensive claim implementation.81
All of the past policy and program mistakes that were made, whether founded 
on good intentions or not, represent essential lessons in ongoing policy develop-
ment and implementation, and the evolving federal-Inuit relationship in general. 
The common themes in the early history of federal administration in the North 
include a lack of consultation with Inuit when developing programs and policies 
for their benefit, such as E-numbers, relocations, tuberculosis treatment, and resi-
dential schools or hostels; and the transposition of southern Canadian methods and 
materials into the North without full consideration to how they may affect Inuit, 
including housing design and construction materials, early educational curricula, 
and models of community governance. The lesson we gain from a better under-
standing of the historic relationship is ultimately the care and cultural competence 
that is required from policy analysts, senior bureaucrats, and politicians in order to 
develop effective programs in concert and consultation with Inuit. Far from being 
a thing of the past, Inuit today continue to decry governments’ lack of meaningful 
consultation, as witnessed by the recent Inuit Circumpolar Declaration on Arctic 
Sovereignty which calls on all arctic governments to engage Inuit as full partners 
in any and all future discussions of sovereignty.82
Researchers and political commentators, Inuit and non-Inuit alike, have strongly 
spoken out against the unacceptable living conditions of many of Canada’s Inuit. 
And this in spite of a clear national interest in strong and healthy Inuit communi-
ties, and a current willingness on the part of the Canadian government to spend 
to further the cause of arctic sovereignty over the Northwest Passage. There is 
need to continue to report on the life circumstances of Canada’s first northern 
residents, not least out of a moral duty to our citizens: to look after our own, which 
ultimately reflects on who we are as a people and the kind of society we strive to 
be—one that espouses equality within diversity. John Ralston Saul recently wrote 
in his book, A Fair Country: “There seems to be little understanding in the South 
… that Canada as a whole benefits and is truer to itself when there are strong 
Northern communities that stand out as expressions of our country.”83 In order 
to respond to current circumstances with well-conceived policies in consultation 
with those whose lives they are designed to improve, we need to better understand 
what has come before, including the mistakes that have been made, notably a lack 
of consultation and cultural competence when developing those policies.
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 2 See government guidelines on its duty to consult, “Aboriginal Consultation and Accommodation 
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Inuit in the Mackenzie Delta with the same status as First Nations in the region because of their 
close geographic proximity to one another. Inuit received economic relief, education in mission 
schools, and the services of a doctor at Herschel Island. Between 1921 and 1931, most govern-
ment policy related to Inuit was administered by the Northwest Territories and Yukon Branch 
of the Department of the Interior, such as the reindeer-herding program. This program was an 
economic initiative designed to relieve Inuit from caribou shortage-induced starvation. Mark O. 
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 7 Editor’s note: The Constitution Act of 1867 did not explicitly deal with the North as it was not 
part of the Dominion at that date.
 8 By 1932, the cost of Inuit relief in Quebec was nine dollars per person annually. Relief for First 
Nations was funded federally, as First Nations in Canada were wards of the state. The Canadian 
government, however, administered Inuit as citizens. Constance Backhouse, Colour-Coded: a 
Legal History of Racism in Canada,1900–1950, pp. 21–22, 34; Jenness, pp. 32, 40; and Peter 
Kulchyski, Unjust Relations: Aboriginal Rights in Canadian Courts, pp. 32–33.
 9 Specifically, an 1856 HBC census of northern Quebec classified Inuit (Esquimaux) as Indians. 
As the Crown had invested the HBC with administrative authority, their description of Inuit was 
particularly significant to the Supreme Court’s decision. Although much of the region inhabited 
by Inuit was Rupert’s Land in 1867, and therefore not part of Canada at Confederation, the 
Constitution Act, 1867 provided for the addition of territories to Confederation. Rupert’s Land 
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who wrote to O. D. Skelton, undersecretary of state for external affairs, and requested that an 
APR Volume 7.indb   165 1/13/10   12:13:54 PM
 
This is an excerpt from "Volume 7: A History of Treaties and Policies" in the Aboriginal Policy Research Series, © Thompson Educational Publishing, Inc., 2013 
To order copies of this volume, visit www.thompsonbooks.com or call 1-877-366-2763.
1  /  Part Two: From History to Policy
appeal be made for a reversal of the decision. The Supreme Court of Canada was created in 
1875, but decisions could be appealed to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (JCPC) in 
London until 1933 for criminal appeals and 1949 for civil appeals. Jenness, p. 40; and Diubaldo, 
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nizations. Dickerson, pp. 32, 37–46, 56; and R. Duffy, The Road to Nunavut: The Progress of the 
Eastern Arctic Since the Second World War, p 11.
12 Re Eskimo was used in a 1957 report for the Department of Northern Affairs and National 
Resources, which questioned the Newfoundland government’s legal obligation to Labrador 
Inuit based on Newfoundland’s 1949 entrance to Confederation, ten years after the Re Eskimo 
decision. Here, the Supreme Court ruling that Inuit were historically classified as Indians was 
used to employ a 1950 ruling by the Department of Justice. This ruling, that “it is the responsibil-
ity of the federal government to formulate and carry out all policies that are directed at dealing 
with Indians or Indian problems,” demonstrated federal responsibility for Labrador Inuit. C. J. 
Marshall, Federal Responsibilities in Respect to the Native Population of Labrador, p. 4.
13 For example, if a female infant was named after her maternal grandfather, the infant’s mother 
could address her child by name, or as “daughter” or “father.” This practice was considered 
appropriate, since many Inuit believed that namesakes often took on their name-givers personal-
ity traits. Given the small sizes of most communities, family genealogies would be well known 
and such multiple forms of address for each person would not cause confusion among Inuit. Kaj 
Birket-Smith, The Eskimos, pp. 138, 153–163.
14 Identification and Registration of Indian and Inuit People, p. 23; and Barry A. Roberts, Eskimo 
Identification and Disc Numbers: a Brief History, pp. 12–15.
15 Kenneth Coates, Canada’s Colonies: A History of the Yukon and Northwest Territories, pp. 167–
180; and Kenneth C. Eyre, “Forty Years of Military Activity in the Canadian North, 1947–87,” 
p. 292.
16 William R. Morrison, “Eagle Over the Arctic: Americans in the Canadian North, 1867–1985,” 
p. 177.
17 These stations were designed to give at least four hours of warning to protect North America 
against airborne attacks from the Soviet Union. 
18 The NORAD agreement was initially specified for a ten-year period and is now revised at five-
year intervals. D. F. Holman, NORAD In the New Millennium, p. 12.
19 By the late 1950s, intercontinental missiles with thermonuclear warheads, rather than the 
bombers, which the DEW Line was designed to protect against, had become the major threat to 
North America, rendering the DEW Line technology obsolete. 
20 Morrison, p. 170; and Arthur Charo, Continental Air Defence: A Neglected Dimension of 
Strategic Defence, p. 7.
21 These included the Mid-Canada Line and the Pine Tree Line stations, as well as stations located 
in Ontario, Quebec, New Brunswick, and British Columbia. The Pine Tree Line (also called 
the Continental Air Defense Integration North (CADIN) Line) was located along the northern 
boundary of the United States and stretched into Newfoundland. The Mid-Canada Line (also 
called the McGill Fence) was built and operated by Canada along the fifty-fifth parallel. The 
DEW Line sites were built along the seventieth parallel. They started in Alaska at Cape Lisburne 
and ran eastward along the coast, crossing to the Arctic islands, then to the Boothia and Melville 
peninsulas, then to the southeast corner of Baffin Island at Cape Dyer. Duffy, p. 33; N. D. Bankes, 
“Forty Years of Canadian Sovereignty Assertion in the Arctic 1947–87,” p. 286; Joseph T. Jockel, 
No Boundaries Upstairs: Canada, the United States, and the Origins of North American Air 
Defence, 1945–1958, p. 2; Morrison, pp. 178–179; and Maurice Sauve, Interim Report of the 
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Special Committee of the House of Commons on Matters Relating to Defence, pp. 20–21.
22 Northern Rangers are paid to attend initial and annual training courses for any National Defence 
operations in which they participate. National Defence, May 1, 2003, Ranger FAQs, <http://
www.cfna.forces.gc.ca/units/rangers/crpg_faqs_e.sap>, accessed July 14, 2005. The Northern 
Rangers program has increased to the present, and was expected to include 4,800 members by 
2008. The Ranger Patrol makes effective use of Inuit traditional knowledge of northern lands and 
resources, and Inuit youth are provided with practical opportunities to acquire and make use of 
traditional skills and knowledge through the Junior Canadian Ranger program. Since 1942, the 
Canadian Ranger Patrol Group has played a significant role in maintaining Canada’s presence 
and sovereignty in remote regions of the North. Duffy, p. 33; and Eyre, pp. 295–296.
23 Such projects have contributed to improved community infrastructure, including airports and 
runways, roads, buildings, and hydro and sewage disposal systems. Eyre, p. 292.
24 For example, many of the airport runways constructed for defence projects have since been 
turned over to community administration, facilitating the movement of people between northern 
communities and southern Canada, as well as the delivery of items, like mail and fresh foods. D. 
K. Thomas and C. T. Thompson, Eskimo Housing as Planned Culture Change, pp. 10–11.
25 National Defence, August 31, 2001, “Backgrounder: The Distant Early Warning Line Clean up 
Project,” <http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=205>, accessed June 
5, 2006; San Francisco Chronicle, November 3, 2001, “Heated Arctic Dispute Greenland;” 
“Alaska Natives Balk at New U.S. Military Plans,” <http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.
cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/2001/11/03/MN151862.DTL>, accessed June 14, 2006; and 
Lexum, October 4, 1999, “Canada-American Treaties,” <http://www.lexum.umontreal.ca/ca_
us/en/cts.1996.35.en.html>, accessed June 14, 2006.
26 These projects also served Cold War defence needs. Morrison, p. 177. For a detailed discussion 
of North American defence in the Canadian Arctic, see Jockel, No Boundaries Upstairs�
27 The Order in Council was precipitated by a request for a land grant land in Cumberland Sound 
by an American navy engineer in 1874. The Order in Council did not specify that Canada had a 
social responsibility for Inuit welfare. Jenness, p. 17; Morris Zaslow, The Northwest Territories, 
1905–1980, pp. 4–5.
28 In 1901, the government funded a North Pole expedition by Captain J. E. Bernier and his Canadian 
ship, Arctic. The Canadian government later appointed Bernier to make annual tours of the Arctic 
coast and islands on the Canadian ship, Neptune. He was given authority to inspect any ships 
that he encountered, and to carry out navigational and scientific studies. He also left documents 
declaring Canadian sovereignty on many Arctic islands. Bernier obtained much public support 
for his voyage, including that of Lord Strathcona, Governor General Minto, and 113 members of 
Parliament who signed a petition requesting that the government fund Bernier’s expedition. The 
government also funded Vilhalmur Stefansson’s explorations of the western Arctic Archipelago 
from 1913 to 1918. Jenness, pp. 22, 29–30; D. Soberman, “Report to the Canadian Human Rights 
Commission on the Complaints of the Inuit People Relocated from Inukjuak and Pond Inlet, to 
Grise Fiord and Resolute Bay,” p. 55; Zaslow, The Opening of the Canadian North, 1870–1914, 
p. 263; and Zaslow, The Northwest Territories, 1905–1980, pp. 4–5.
29 Editor’s note: It may be of interest to readers to look at a sociological analysis of these reloca-
tions. In Chapter One of Aboriginal Conditions (White et al, UBC Press, 2003), the relocations 
are analyzed and it is concluded that they broke down the social capital in the communities, 
leading to or at least contributing to social and economic breakdown.
30 Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (RCAP), Looking Forward, Looking Back, Vol. 1, p. 
455. 
31 Ibid., Shelagh D. Grant, “Inuit Relocations to the High Arctic, 1953–1960.” Submission to 
RCAP, pp. iv–v.
32 Although the government had some success with several small-scale relocations, the 1957 
relocation of several Inuit families from Ennadai Lake in the Keewatin District north to Henik 
Lake failed when caribou herds did not appear; after eight people died the remaining Inuit were 
returned to Ennadai Lake. In 1934, Inuit from Pangnirtung, Cape Dorset, and Pond Inlet were 
relocated to Devon Island for two years as an experiment. The government wanted to determine 
how difficult it would be for Inuit to adapt to the High Arctic climate. The experiment was 
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unsuccessful, and the Pangnirtung Inuit returned home in 1936. The Cape Dorset and Pond Inlet 
Inuit were relocated to Arctic Bay, then to Fort Ross in 1937. In 1947, they were relocated 
to Spence Bay. Although Inuit repeatedly requested to return to their homes, the government 
refused. According to the RCAP, “the idea that they could return home if they didn’t like the new 
location was key in getting the Inuit to agree to go in the first place. The failure of the govern-
ment to keep its promises is a stark example of the arbitrary use of authority.” RCAP, Looking 
Forward, Looking Back, Vol. 1, p. 456. 
  Other Arctic relocations included the 1949 relocation of Inuit from Ennadai Lake to Nueltin Lake, 
the movement of Inuit from Garry Lake to Rankin Inlet (“Keewatin Re-establishment Project” or 
“Itivia”) and Whale Cove in the 1950s, and the 1951 relocation of families from the Mackenzie 
Delta to Banks Island. Motivation for this move was explicitly to alleviate sovereignty concerns. 
Labrador Inuit were relocated from Nutak in 1956 and Hebron in 1959 to Okak Bay to centralize 
their administration and facilitate their transition from an economy based on hunting and fishing 
to industrial development. Diubaldo (1992), 31–34; Bud Neville, former Indian and Northern 
Affairs Canada employee, interview by author, November 9, 2004, digital recording, Public 
History, Ottawa; and RCAP, Looking Forward, Looking Back, Vol. 1, pp. 422–425, 460–462. 
For a more detailed discussion of Inuit relocations, see Frank James Tester and Peter Kulchyski, 
Tammarniit (Mistakes): Inuit Relocation in the Eastern Arctic, 1939–1963. 
33 The RCAP uses the term “de facto” in their description of the Canadian government’s comfort 
level with the security of Arctic sovereignty in the early 1950s. RCAP, “Shedding New Light on 
the Relocation: Summary of the Commission’s Conclusions,” Report on High Arctic Relocation, 
p. 136.
34 Inuit Tapirisat of Canada (ITC) initially lodged complaints about the relocation with the Canadian 
Human Rights Commission (CHRC) in 1990. The CHRC referred the matter to the Department 
of Indian Affairs and Northern Development (DIAND), who commissioned the Hickling Corpo-
ration to investigate the legitimacy of the claims. Hickling concluded that the government acted 
properly; in response, ITC appealed to the CHRC. The CHRC arranged for ITC and DIAND to 
review circumstances of the relocations, leading to the launch of the Royal Commission inquiry. 
Criticisms of the relocations include concerns that Inuit were not fully prepared to make the adap-
tations in lifestyle required of them, and consequently experienced food shortages and discom-
fort. The ITC perceived that Inuit involved in these relocations were part of an “experiment” to 
see if they could adapt to the climate and live independently through hunting and trapping. This 
perception explains why little funding or assistance was extended to them in the initial seven 
years of the project. As Inuit were representing Canadian sovereignty in the High Arctic, the 
government was reluctant to grant requests for their return to Inukjuak. Grant, “Inuit Relocations 
to the High Arctic, 1953–1960,” pp. iii–iv; and Soberman, pp. 1–3, 55–57. 
  In contrast, other researchers have concluded that these relocations were conducted primarily 
for the economic benefit of Inuit, with sovereignty concerns remaining a side issue and a low 
priority in the planning and execution of the project. While some have claimed that the govern-
ment did not keep its promise to return Inuit to their home communities if they wished, others 
have asserted that these promises were intended for only the first few years of the project and 
were not extended indefinitely. Therefore, in 1960, the government was not remiss in suggest-
ing that Inuit charter their own plane to visit friends and family in northern Quebec. Hickling 
Corporation, “Assessment of the Factual Basis of Certain Allegations Made Before the Standing 
Committee on Aboriginal Affairs Concerning the Relocation of Inukjuak Inuit Families in the 
1950s,” pp. 1–7. See also: Shelagh D. Grant, “A Case of Compounded Error: The Inuit Resettle-
ment Project, 1953, and the Government Response, 1990,” pp. 3–29; M. Gunther, The 1953 
Relocations of the Inukjuak Inuit to the High Arctic: A Documentary Analysis and Evaluation; 
Marc M. Hammond, Report on Findings on an Alleged Promise of Government to Finance the 
Return of Inuit at Resolute and Grise Fiord to their Original Homes at Port Harrison (Inukjuak) 
and Pond Inlet; Alan R. Marcus, Inuit Relocation Policies in Canada and Other Circumpolar 
Countries, 1925–1960; Alan Rudolph Marcus, Relocating Eden: The Image and Politics of Inuit 
Exile in the Canadian Arctic; and RCAP, The High Arctic Relocation: Summary of Supporting 
Information, Vols� I and II�
35 Rosemarie Kuptana, “Ilira: Or Why it is Unthinkable for Inuit to Challenge Qallunaat Authority,” 
paper presented to the RCAP, April 5, 1993, Ottawa.
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36 Ibid.
37 Despite contradiction by former civil servants’ testimony, and their caution that the actions of 
1953 should not be viewed through the moral lens of 1993, the commission concluded that relo-
cations were a product of the government’s desire to ensure Inuit self-reliance. Although food 
shortages were not as much of a problem in Inukjuak in the early 1950s, the government was 
concerned about dropping fox fur prices and the ability of Inuit to compensate for this loss of 
income on their own. To prevent rising welfare costs to the government, they designed the reloca-
tion project to ensure Inuit independence. According to the commission, this conclusion explains 
why relocated Inuit were not provided with financial and material support. RCAP, “Commission 
Releases Report on High Arctic Relocation,” press release, pp. 1–2.
38 Ibid., p. 3. During the 1980s, several Inuit requested to be permanently returned to Inukjuak and 
Pond Inlet from Grise Fiord and Resolute. The Canadian government funded the relocation, and 
offered to refund Inuit who had paid for their own relocation several years earlier. 
39 Government-sponsored relocations helped to create centralized communities in the Keewatin 
region more than anywhere else in the North, yet these communities also reflect Inuit agency 
in their selection of where to settle. David Damas, Arctic Migrants/Arctic Villagers: The Trans-
formation of Inuit Settlement in the Central Arctic, pp. 192–193; G. P. Nixon, Eskimo Housing 
Programmes, 1954–65: a Case Study of Representative Bureaucracy, pp. 90–149; Duffy, p. 
16–17; and Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami, 2005, “Backgrounder on Inuit and Housing for Discussion at 
Housing Sectoral Meeting,” <www.itk.ca/roundtable/sectoral-housing-backgrounder.php>, 
accessed July 6, 2005.
40 In 1958, the Eskimo Affairs Committee made recommendations to guide all future Inuit reloca-
tions and recommended surveys of several priority regions to determine the future feasibility of 
relocations. These regions included Keewatin, the east coast of Hudson Bay, the Tuktoyaktuk-
Coppermine region, and the north part of Baffin Island. Based on the discovery of mineral and oil 
deposits in the High Arctic during the 1960s, the federal government created further recommen-
dations for Inuit relocations, suggesting Inuit be housed near weather stations in otherwise unin-
habited areas, thereby maintaining Canadian sovereignty of the North and its resource extrac-
tion potential. Looking Forward, Looking Back: Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal 
Peoples, Vol. 1, pp. 422–430, 465–466, and 511–512.
41 Throughout the 1970s, however, the federal government continued to make decisions about the 
feasibility of northern communities, which affected their location and survival. Although Inuit at 
Killiniq in Nunavik were represented in the 1975 James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement, 
between 1975 and 1978 government services to their community, including health care and infra-
structure maintenance, were gradually reduced or terminated. In February 1978, Inuit at Killiniq 
were notified by radio that their community would be closed, and that they would be relocated 
within the same day. The Killiniq Inuit, who were distributed among five Nunavik communi-
ties, have since petitioned for the establishment of a community near the original Killiniq site. 
Makivik Corporation, with the assistance of Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, has conducted 
feasibility studies for this relocation. Although the studies concluded that a community near 
the original Killiniq site was economically viable, no action has been taken to construct the 
necessary community infrastructure. Looking Forward, Looking Back, pp. 422–430, 465–466, 
and 511–512; and Makivik Corporation, The Relocation to Taqpangajuk: a Feasibility Study, pp. 
i–v.
42 Inuit Circumpolar Conference, November 30, 2004, ADM Forum on Globalization, Identity, and 
Citizenship, <www.inuitcircumpolar.com/flash_player_icc_select.php>, accessed March 3, 
2005.
43 The Inuit Circumpolar Declaration on Arctic Sovereignty, <www.itk.ca/circumpolar-inuit-
declaration-arctic-sovereignty> accessed May 4, 2009.
44 Diubaldo, p. 30.
45 “Pragmatic” is the term used by Gordon Robertson, the Deputy Minister of Northern Affairs and 
National Resources during the 1950s, to describe federal policy and program development for 
Inuit during this period. R. Gordon Robertson, interview by author, November 9, 2004, digital 
recording, Public History, Ottawa.
46 Three of the residential schools were Catholic and were located at Aklavik, Fort Resolution, 
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and Fort Providence. One residential school, also at Aklavik, was Anglican. Only one of the 
day schools, an Anglican-run facility at Pangnirtung, was located in the eastern Arctic. Of the 
remaining eight day schools, five were Catholic, one was Anglican, and two were public. The 
schools accommodated Aboriginal (Inuit, Métis, and First Nation) and non-Aboriginal students. 
Missionary societies were granted $400 per year to operate residential schools, $200 to $250 
annually for day schools, and $500 to $1,500 was given to operate public day schools. The eastern 
Arctic received its first two federal day schools from the Department of Mines and Resources 
in 1949 and 1950. The schools were located in Coral Harbour and Cape Dorset. Government of 
Canada, Education in the North, p. 2; Duffy, pp. 95–96; Patrick Flanagan, “Schooling, Souls and 
Social Class: the Labrador Inuit,” pp. ii–iii, 54–56; and Ben-Dor, pp. 297–301.
47 In Canada at this time about one in fifteen Canadian Inuit were literate. Duffy, pp. 95–97, 105.
48 Hostel accommodations were established in Iqaluit, Great Whale River, Churchill, Inuvik, and 
Yellowknife. As well as residential schools and hostels, some Inuit children were boarded in 
private homes. Children living in residential schools found it physically difficult to adjust to meat-
based diets and outdoor living after spending ten months in school residences. Parents expressed 
concern about their children’s lack of respect for the family and culture. By 1959, residential 
schools with vocational training and teachers’ quarters had opened in Iqaluit, Fort Macpherson, 
Fort Smith, and Aklavik. Between 1960 and 1967, similar facilities were constructed at Pangnir-
tung, Broughton Island, Arctic Bay, Resolute Bay, Clyde River, Igloolik, Pond Inlet, Grise Fiord, 
Padloping, Lake Harbour, and Hall Beach. Residential schools were found to be “diseducative” 
for students returning to camp life or even very rural communities. The experiences of residen-
tial school were often so different from community life that students did not carry over skills or 
knowledge they had acquired. To the frustration of students, they were often required to repeat 
the same grade several times as the length of the school year was shorter for Inuit students, 
because of parents’ need to move to summer camps, than was needed to complete grade-level 
curriculum. Duffy, pp. 97, 105; Charles W. Hobart, “Report on Canadian Arctic Eskimos: some 
consequences of residential schooling,” pp. 13–17; David King, “A Brief Report of The Federal 
Government of Canada’s Residential School System for Inuit,” Aboriginal Healing Foundation, 
2006, <www.ahf.ca/assets/pdf/english/king-summary-f-web.pdf>, accessed June 14, 2006); 
and D. W. Simpson and D. K. F. Wattie, “The Role and Impact of the Educational Program in the 
Process of Change in Canadian Eskimo Communities,” 19th Alaskan Science Conference, p. 1.
49 Duffy, pp. 114–116; John K. Naysmith, “The Impact of Technology Upon Native People and 
their Traditional Pursuits;” and Naullaq Arnaquq, Assistant Deputy Minister, Department of 
Culture, Language, Elders and Youth, Government of Nunavut, and Peesee Pitsiulak, Campus 
Director, Nunavut Arctic College, interview by author, April 27, 2005, digital recording, Trigram 
Centre, Iqaluit, Nunavut.
50 Duffy, p. 106; and Simpson and Wattie, p. 2.
51 Abraham Okpik, “Ancient People in a Changing World,” Imperial Oil Review 44, pp. 17–20.
52 The government also realized the importance of providing at least some education during early 
grades in traditional languages to ease the transition of young children from home to school, and 
continued to expand programming that utilized languages, such as Inuktitut, the Inuit language 
spoken in the eastern Arctic. David Omar Born, Eskimo Education and the Trauma of Social 
Change, p. 1.
53 These assistants are the first example of Inuit as classroom teachers. Teachers were expected to 
participate in community activities after school hours and were often leaders of recreational and 
organized activities, such as Girl Guide and Boy Scout groups. Many northern teachers had one 
year of experience and were between the ages of twenty-six and thirty. By 1960, all northern 
teachers had at least a first-class teaching certificate. Government of Canada, Education in the 
North: Ten Years of, pp. 5–6, 13; D. K. F. Wattie, “Education in the Canadian Arctic,” p. 298. 
  Federally run adult education and vocational programs were also offered to prepare Inuit for 
work in viable economic opportunities, while ensuring maintenance of their connection with 
family and community. The 1968 manual for a course in managing co-operative businesses for 
Inuit, sponsored by Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, is an example of such an initiative. The 
course was designed and packaged for instruction within northern communities, and includes 
speaking notes, visual aids, and a coursebook for participants that is translated into both English 
and Inuktitut. The course explained the history of the shift from a subsistence-oriented way of 
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life to a wage-labour oriented lifestyle, how Arctic co-operatives should operate, and where co-
operatives existed within the context of the Canadian and international economies. Born, p. 1; 
and Keith J. Crowe and E. Erkloo, Introduction to Arctic Co-operatives, pp. 1–2.
54 Additionally, in 1969, only 25 percent of Aboriginal peoples in the Northwest Territories had 
full-time wage employment. By 1970, 60 percent of the population of the Northwest Territories 
had not received any formal education. Duffy, pp. 127–129; Paul Welsman, “Education of Native 
Peoples in the Northwest Territories: A Northern Model,” p. 38.
55 The Department of Resources and Development sent a representative on the RCMP annual Eastern 
Arctic Patrol to assess the level of education then provided to Inuit and to make recommendations 
for their future needs. The government realized it was impractical for Inuit to maintain traditional 
subsistence practices, and that some degree of assimilation to southern Canadian culture would 
be required for their successful participation in the wage economy. Duffy, p. 102.
56 Duffy, p. 111–114; Welsman, p. 21; and Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami, “Backgrounder on Inuit 
and Education for Discussion at Life Long Learning Sectoral Meetings,” October 20, 2004, 
<www.itk.ca/roundtable/sectoral-lifelearning-backgrounder.php>, accessed July 19, 2005. 
57 Jose Kusugak, “The Inuit of Canada: Charting the Future in the New Millennium,” p. 6; 
“Timelines and Milestones: 30 Years With ITC,” p. 43; and Duffy, pp.118–119.
58 The Inuit Cultural Institute is a branch organization of Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami, whose objective 
is to preserve and promote traditional Inuit languages and cultures. Duffy, pp. 118–121.
59 NICE lacked funding, however, only met once, and did not establish any alternative educational 
programming for Inuit. Duffy, p.121.
60 This report was based on experimental studies carried out under the project in 1971 and 1972, 
which included community-guided education in Nunavik, an apprentice teacher program for 
Inuit, and educating southern teachers to prepare them for their role in the North. Man in the 
North Project, Education in the Canadian North: Three Reports, 1971–1972, pp. v, 7–9.
61 Ibid., pp. 57, 115–125. The apprentice teacher program provided training opportunities for 
Inuit that combined academic upgrading with in-service training. The program to acculturate 
Canadians for northern teaching focused on the culture and history of the North and its communi-
ties, respecting the significance Inuit placed in maintaining and transferring knowledge of tradi-
tional skills to young people, and providing assistance to teachers in their process of acculturating 
to the North.
62 Thomas Berger, “Conciliator’s Final Report: ‘The Nunavut Project.’”
63 Diseases such as influenza, measles, small pox, chicken pox, and poliomyelitis were particularly 
detrimental to Inuit populations. Medical supplies were left with community “distributors,” such 
as the RCMP and Hudson’s Bay Company (HBC) personnel, as well as the Roman Catholic 
and Anglican missionary hospitals. The Eastern Arctic Patrol began in 1922 on the Canadian 
ship Arctic, captained by J. E. Bernier. In 1925, Arctic was retired and replaced by Beothic, then 
Ungava in 1932, Nascopie in 1933 (this was an HBC ship), C� D� Howe in 1950, and d’Iberville 
in 1953. Duffy, p. 52; and C. R. Maundrell and C. Graham-Cumming, “Health of the Original 
Canadians, 1867–1967,” pp. 142–146.
64 Nine of these facilities were located in the western Arctic, and only two were in the eastern 
Arctic, with one also serving Inuit in northern Quebec. Eldorado Mining and Refining Ltd. at 
Great Bear Lake, and Consolidated Mining and Smelting Co. at Yellowknife owned the mining 
company facilities. These facilities were quite small and mainly treated their employees but 
would also take outside patients. The two hospitals in the eastern Arctic were the Catholic facility 
at Chesterfield Inlet and the Anglican St. Luke’s Hospital and Industrial Home at Pangnirtung, 
which also served northern Quebec. Duffy, p. 52.
65 Inuit may still have difficulty finding the burial place of family members who died from tuber-
culosis in southern sanatoria, as sometimes the only grave marker used was an Inuk’s E-number, 
with the original name references hidden within government archives.  
66 In a 1960 article published in the Northern Affairs Bulletin, Abraham Okpik (who later led 
Project Surname on behalf of the federal government) wrote about the two years of tuberculosis 
care that he received at the Misericordia Hospital in Edmonton and then at the Charles Camsell 
Hospital. According to Okpik, the federal government’s intervention during the 1940s tuberculo-
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sis epidemic was the beginning of the transition period for Inuit from a traditional way of life to 
one influenced by southern Canadian culture. As Okpik states, “none of us Eskimo people ever 
had time to ask how the Government of Canada got interested in our general health.” Abraham 
Okpik, “What do the Eskimo People Want,” pp. 38-39.
67 For example, in 1946, 37 children under age fifteen died on southern Baffin Island, and approxi-
mately 20 children died in the Cumberland Sound area. Most of these children were undernour-
ished and lived in what administrators considered “poorer” camps. Most children died between 
December and March when food was in shortest supply. Between 1956 and 1958, infant mortality 
rates across Canada averaged 31 per 100,000. Among Inuit, however, the infant mortality rate 
was 230 per 100,000. Mortality rates among infants between two and twelve months old were 
higher than for newborns under one month of age, leading the Northern Health Services Office 
to conclude that inadequate housing with poor heating, unsanitary living conditions, exposure to 
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